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Abstract. This paper considers voluntary transmissive contacts between partially
altruistic individuals in the presence of asymptomatic infection. Two different types of
externalities from contacts are considered, infection externalities and socioeconomic ex-
ternalities. When contacts are incidental, then externalities work through disease propa-
gation. When contacts are essential, both infection and socioeconomic externalities are
present. It is shown that for incidental contacts, equilibrium involves suboptimally high
exposure whereas for essential contacts, equilibrium exposure is suboptimally low. An
increase in altruism may thus increase or decrease disease transmission, depending on
the type of contact under consideration. The analysis implies that policy to manage the
epidemic should differentiate between different types of tranmissive activities.
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1. Introduction
In trying to contain the spread of COVID-19, authorities have implemented severe restrictions
on social and economic life across a variety of spaces, sectors and activities, including work
places, entertainment venues, schools and shops. Yet even at the height of severe lockdowns
across the world in the Spring of 2020, some activities were still permitted. For example, in
the UK some public transport remained available, as did schooling for children of key workers
such as those working for the NHS. The reason for these exceptions is economically sound and
has to be found in the role that those services play in supporting other sectors in the economy.
Schooling for children of key workers is necessary to ensure the functioning of hospitals and
intensive care units, as is public transport. In other words, these sectors have strong socioeco-
nomic externalities on other sectors in the economy. On the other hand, it is also true that by
maintaining open schools at the height of the epidemic, there were higher chances of disease
transmission than would have been achieved by a blanket lockdown.
Both infection transmission and economic and social life relies on different degrees of phys-
ical proximity and it is the very activities that make up the fabric of everyday life that causes
the infection to spread, and not some optional side activity that can be scaled back at minor
cost or inconvenience. But this means that what people do or do not do to protect themselves
does not only have an effect on whether infection spreads through the population. By alter-
ing their behavior, people also impact others’economic and social possibilities and well-being.
In other words, there are multiple competing externalities, namely infection externalities and
socioeconomic externalities. In evaluating the welfare effects of different courses of action, one
must weigh these different externalities against each other.
In this paper, I distinguish between two types of contacts which may potentially cause
transmission of infection between people. An essential contact is any interaction between
individuals in which physical proximity is an essential component of the interaction. This
∗I wish to thank Toke Aidt and Jakob Berndt for useful feedback on this work. Parts of this paper are based
on Toxvaerd (2017) and were presented at the Covid-19 Symposium of the Meetings of the European Economic
Association (2020).
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can include any economic or professional transaction such as that between a customer and a
waiter in a restaurant, between doctors and nurses in a hospital or between students in the
classroom. In addition, essential contacts include most voluntary sexual interactions where
physical proximity is of the essence. In contrast, an incidental contact is any interaction that
comes about by chance and which is not essential for the creation of surplus or exchange. For
example, people sharing an elevator can be thought of as incidental, as each individual would be
better offnot sharing a confined space. Of course, some interactions do not fit neatly into these
extremes and should be found on the continuum in between. For example, most people enjoy
the presence of other people in a bar or in a restaurant. Their presence is not essential for the
consumption of a meal or a drink, but it does contribute to improving the overall atmosphere.
The thing to note is that while incidental contacts entail only a disease externality, essential
contacts feature both infection externalities and socioeconomic externalities.
In a simple model of contact and disease transmission, I consider equilibrium exposure
decisions under incidental and essential contacts, respectively. I also evaluate the social value
of such contacts and find that equilibrium exposure may be too high or too low from a social
perspective, depending on the nature of the contacts. With incidental contacts, I find that
because individuals do not fully internalize the infection externality, they expose themselves
too much. This echoes the traditional finding in the economic epidemiology literature on self-
protection such as vaccination and social distancing. In contrast, I find that with essential
contacts, individuals do not expose themselves enough from a social perspective. The reason
is that they do not internalize the socioeconomic externalities of their exposure decisions.
While most of the economic-epidemiological literature on disease control relies on the as-
sumption of self-interested behavior, there is widespread recognition that people have mixed
motives when deciding how to act during an epidemic. Altruism in the context of sexual de-
cision making has been discussed by Philipson and Posner (1993) and Gong (2015). O’Dell et
al. (2008) argue that “In the context of sexual risk behavior, both self-interest and concern for
others may play a role in the decision to practice safer sex”. How then, does altruism impact
peoples’exposure decisions and how does it influence the spread of diseases in the population?
Duffi n (2004) reports that in HIV education, “[Altruism] describes the responsibility of a per-
son with HIV to avoid transmitting the virus”.1 While this approach may accurately reflect
the effects of altruism in some contexts, it is somewhat odd because it conflates a statement
about peoples’underlying preferences (namely regard for the welfare of others), with state-
ments about specific actions which may or may not further the well-being of others, depending
on context. As noted by Philipson and Posner (1993), “An altruist is less likely to risk infecting
his sexual partner [...] than an egoist. [...] On the other hand an altruist may be more willing
to engage in risky sex if his or her partner derives utility from it”. This is a key insight, because
it makes explicit that altruism is a commitment to include others’well-being when deliberating
and thus is two-way between people. This means that in contexts where individuals’participa-
tion is voluntary, like most professional and sexual interactions, it is the altruism of the most
reluctant party which will determine whether contact takes place. As will be shown formally
below, this may imply that more altruism may lead to more risky contacts and thus to more
disease transmission than would be the case between egoists.
While the literature on the economics of infectious diseases is rich and growing fast, a
few papers are particularly relevant to the present work. Toxvaerd (2017), Toxvaerd (2019),
Rowthorn and Toxvaerd (2020), Bisin and Gottardi (2020) and Assenza et al. (2020) all
consider models in which the nature of externalities features heavily, but in different formal
environments. McAdams (2020) considers a model in which matched individuals produce
1Similarly, Kerwin (2014) states that “[...] purely self-interested people should see little or no marginal cost
from further risky sex if they are already infected, while altruistic people would want to take measures to protect
their prospective partners. A parallel logic applies to those who learn they are HIV-negative”.
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Figure 1: Exposure decisions and potential contact. Individual 1 has already chosen exposure,
while individual 2 is deciding whether to do so.
output that is supermodular, like in Toxvaerd (2017) and in the extended model considered in
the present work. Last, the paper is related to the literature on matching in disease contexts,
such as Geoffard and Philipson (1995) and Dow and Philipson (1996).
In non-infection contexts, altruism has been studied by Bergstrom (1999) in an abstract
setting and in the context of intergenerational models in papers by Kimball (1987) and Galperti
and Strulovici (2017).
In Section 2, I set out the formal model and briefly consider the effects of sorting on disease
transmission. In Section 3, I consider the case of incidental contacts, characterizing equilibria
and evaluating their welfare properties. In Section 4, I do the same for the case of essential
contacts. In Section 5, I conclude. Appendix A contains a brief analysis of a special case
omitted in the main text.
2. A Model of Contacts and Externalities
The model is a variant of the framework of Philipson and Posner (1993), extended to allow
for altruistic preferences and for different types of contacts as in Toxvaerd (2017). Consider
two individuals i and j who simultaneously make exposure decisions ai ∈ {0, 1}. The setup is
illustrated in Figure 1. Each individual i has a material utility function Ui(ai, aj) but seeks to
maximize the objective function
Vi(ai, aj) = Ui(ai, aj) + AUj(aj, ai) (1)
whereA ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of altruism.2 This is a common formalization of altruism that nests
the cases of completely selfish behavior (A = 0) and perfectly altruistic behavior (A = 1).3 In
what follows, I will analyze Nash equilibria in which each individual i simultaneously and non-
cooperatively chooses strategy ai to maximise Vi(ai, aj). As noted by Levine (2015), altruism
itself means only that people include others’well-being in their deliberations; it does not ensure
that individuals are able to coordinate their actions on mutually desirable outcomes. Thus for
the purposes of this analysis, the altruistic Nash equilibrium seems an appropriate solution
concept.
2An alternative formulation would be to assume that each individual maximizes Vi(ai, aj) = Ui(ai, aj) +
AVj(ai, aj). Such preferences create what Kimball (1987) calls a “hall of mirrors”effect in which i values the
utility that j attaches to the value that i attaches to the value of j,... See also an example of similar preferences
in Bergstrom (1999). In this case, the objective can be rewritten as Vi(ai, aj) = [Ui(ai, aj)+AUj(ai, aj)]/(1−A2)
which implies that when individuals are perfectly altruistic and A → 1, valuations are unbounded. With this
formulation, aggregate welfare is W (ai, aj) = Vi(ai, aj) + Vj(ai, aj) = [Ui(ai, aj) + Uj(ai, aj)] /(1−A).
3See Chen and Kempe (2008), who also consider the case A = −1, corresponding to spiteful preferences.
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Turning to the material preferences, these are given by the function
Ui(ai, aj) = ai [f(ai, aj)− ajrijb] (2)
where the transmission risk rij is the joint probability that i is susceptible and individual j is
infectious. In the special case where the infection states of the two individuals are independent,
the transmission risk from individual j to individual i is given by rij = pj(1−pi). I will assume
throughout that rij ≤ rji so that j is the (weakly) most at-risk individual.
The activity benefit function f(ai, aj) ≤ 1 captures the value of the activity and will
depend on whether contacts are incidental or essential. In what follows, I will consider two
specifications of the activity benefit function f(ai, aj) and explore the effects that this function
has on equilibrium outcomes and their welfare properties.
The parameter b > 1 captures the expected utility cost of becoming infected.4 The bound
on the benefit function f and the magnitude of b imply that a healthy individual facing certain
infection rij = 1 would receive negative material utility Ui(1, 1) < 0 and so would abstain from
contact with the other individual. Away from this special case, the individual faces a tradeoff
between the intrinsic value of exposure and the potential of becoming infected. There are
two qualitatively different cases to consider, namely the case where infection carries significant
discomfort so b is large and the case in which the disease is minor and so b is small. In the
main text, I consider the first of these cases and in Appendix A, I briefly consider the second.
Throughout, I will assume that the utilitarian social planner seeks to maximize the sum of
the individuals’objectives, i.e. that its objective function is
W (ai, aj) = Vi(ai, aj) + Vj(aj, ai) (3)
= (1 + A) [Ui(ai, aj) + Uj(aj, ai)] (4)
This formulation implies that the planner cares both about actual outcomes and about the
indirect value that individuals derive from being altruistic.5
It is worthwhile dwelling on the sources of interaction. When two individuals have contact,
they each derive the intrinsic benefit from the potentially transmissive activity, captured by
the activity benefit function f(ai, aj). How one individual’s benefit from opting in depends
on the choice of the other individual is exactly what distinguishes incidental contacts from
essential contacts. In addition to the externality through the activity benefit, there is an
infection externality because individuals can infect each other. Unless individuals are known
to be either both healthy or both infected already, the possibility of disease transmission is
a two-way externality. Individual i can infect individual j and vice versa. When evaluating
the desirability of a contact, a social planner will care about both directions of this two-way
infection externality. In contrast, partially altruistic individuals will assign some, but not
necessarily equal, weight to the other individual’s well-being and so not fully internalize this
infection externality. It is clear that the infection externality and the socioeconomic externality
pushes incentives in opposite directions and hence different types of interactions will entail
different equilibrium contact choices and have potentially different welfare properties.
2.1. Controlling transmission through sorting. As is clear from the model, the in-
fection externality works through the possibility of disease transmission between people. But
note that since infection can only be transmitted from infected people to susceptible people,
4The parameter b subsumes both the probability of transmission between serodiscordant people and the
severity of the disease.
5See Sen (1977) for a discussion of different formalizations of altruism. Note that if the planner only cares
about material utilities, then pathological cases may arise in which individuals make equilibrium decisions that
are socially suboptimal only because they are altruistic.
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matches between individuals who share health status cannot help spread the disease. But this
means that one set of tools that may be considered to reduce transmission is any initiative
that effectively sorts individuals on health state. In the context of HIV/AIDS, this practice is
known as serosorting. To see how this works in the present model, let the joint probabilities
over health states be
pmn ≡ Pr(si = m, sj = n) (5)
where si, sj ∈ {0, 1} are the health states of the two individuals. Here the state si = 1 denotes
that individual i is infected and thus infectious, while si = 0 denotes that individual i is healthy
and thus susceptible. The marginal probabilities are then pi = p10 + p11 and pj = p01 + p11.








The measure d captures the degree of assortative matching on infection status, or serosorting
in an HIV/AIDS context. To see this, note that the measure is the fraction of infected contacts
of infected individuals, relative to the fraction of infected contacts of healthy individuals.
Disease transmission then takes place with probability
p10 + p01 =
pi [d(pi − pj) + (1− pi)] + pj(1− pi)
dpi + (1− pi)
(7)
i.e. with the probability that the match is between serodiscordant people. Note that p10 = rji




In other words, the more individuals are sorted, i.e. the better we manage to match infected
individuals with other infected individuals and likewise with healthy individuals, the less will
infection be transmitted.
Note that in the special case with d = 1, i.e. the case in which there is no assortative
matching, incidence is
p10 + p01 = pi(1− pj) + pj(1− pi) (9)
Sorting could happen because of policy interventions that directly control the contact patterns
in the population or endogenously. In Toxvaerd (2017), it is shown that when individuals
interact repeatedly over time, their health states become more highly correlated and thus
disease transmission becomes increasingly unlikely.
Dow and Philipson (1996) conjecture that the presence of altruism can intensify the in-
centives for individuals to engage in positive assortative matching, as people who are more
likely to be infected would have added incentives to avoid matches with those more likely to
be healthy. As will be shown here, altruism changes the incentives of both sides of a match
and it is usually the most at-risk individual who is pivotal to a match being consummated.
The total effect of increased altruism on the types of matches that take place is therefore not
a priori clear.
3. Physical proximity is incidental
In this section, I consider the case in which contacts are incidental, i.e. where only infection
externalities are present. In this case, I assume that f(ai, aj) = 1 and material preferences are
thus given by
Ui(ai, aj) = ai [1− ajrijb] (10)
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This utility function implies that the only possible interaction between individuals’material
well-being is through the possibility of disease transmission and the presence or absence of
others does not impinge on an individual’s benefits from exposure.
Individual i will seek to maximize the altruistic criterion
Vi(ai, aj) = (ai + Aaj)− aiajb(rij + Arji) (11)
Aggregate utilitarian social welfare is then
W (ai, aj) = (1 + A) [ai + aj − aiajb(rij + rji)] (12)
3.1. Equilibrium outcomes. There are three cases to consider:
(i) Suppose that
Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = A (13)
Vj(1, 1) ≥ Vj(0, 1) = A (14)
In this case, the unique equilibrium is (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1). This can happen when there is strong
assortative matching, i.e. when rij and rji are suffi ciently low.
(ii) Suppose that
Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = A (15)
Vj(1, 1) < Vj(0, 1) = A (16)
In this case, the unique equilibrium is (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 0).
(iii) Suppose that
Vi(1, 1) < Vi(0, 1) = A (17)
Vj(1, 1) < Vj(0, 1) = A (18)
In this case, there are two equilibria, namely (a∗i , a
∗




j) = (0, 1).
Summing up, in the first case, the infection externalities are suffi ciently weak and so both
individuals choose to expose themselves rather than opting out altogether. In the second case,
one individual exerts such strong infection externalities on the other that only this individual
chooses to be active, while the most vulnerable individual opts out. In the last case, mutual
infection externalities are more balanced but still suffi ciently high to preclude the presence of
both individuals. Thus in equilibrium, one or the other necessarily stays out while the other
remains active.
3.2. Socially optimal outcomes. Next, I consider the welfare properties of the equilibria.
There are essentially two cases to consider. The first case is when there is only one active
individual in equilibrium, whereas the second case is when there are two active individuals.
Suppose that there is one active individual in equilibrium, e.g. (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 0). In this case,
it turns out that
W (1, 0) = Vi(1, 0) + Vj(0, 1) > Vi(1, 1) + Vj(1, 1) = W (1, 1) (19)
To understand this result, first note that the inequality holds if and only if
b(rij + rji) ≥ 1 (20)
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This inequality simply means that the aggregate external effects of adding one active individual
when one other individual is already active, are larger than the additional benefit from that
additional individual joining.
Turning to the incentive constraints, note that Vj(1, 1) < Vj(0, 1) if and only if
b(rij + Arji) > 1 (21)
In other words, individual j does not wish to have contact with individual i exactly when
its altruism-adjusted external effect is higher than the activity benefit. But then it follows
immediately that if the altruism-adjusted external effect is suffi ciently high to outweigh the
added benefit, then so must the aggregate external effect used in the planner’s calculation. In
conclusion, when there is a unique active individual in equilibrium, then this is also the socially
optimal outcome.
Next, consider the case with two active individuals, i.e. where (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1). For this to
be the case, it must be that
Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = A (22)
Vj(1, 1) ≥ Vj(0, 1) = A (23)
Adding these inequalities implies that
Vi(1, 1) + Vj(1, 1) = (1 + A)[Ui(1, 1) + Uj(1, 1)] ≥ Vi(0, 1) + Vj(0, 1) = 2A (24)
This can also be written as




For the social planner, the presence of two active individuals is only socially optimal if it yields
higher aggregate welfare than the alternative. Since contact is incidental, this means that for
the planner to prefer two active individuals, it must yield higher welfare than having just one
active individual. The condition for optimality of an outcome with two active individuals then
becomes
Vi(1, 1) + Vj(1, 1) = (1 + A)[Ui(1, 1) + Uj(1, 1)] ≥ Vi(1, 0) + Vj(0, 1) = 1 + A (26)
This implies that
[Ui(1, 1) + Uj(1, 1)] ≥ 1 (27)
Since 2A/(1 + A) < 1, it follows that with two active individuals, the condition for social
optimality is harder to satisfy than the condition for an equilibrium.
To understand why there may be socially excessive contact in equilibrium, note that an
individual who contemplates becoming active will compare his or her direct benefit of contact
with the altruism-adjusted infection externality. Whenever the net value is positive, the indi-
vidual will opt for contact. From the planner’s perspective, the value of an additional active
individual is the sum of the individual’s utility and the external effect that the contact has
on the other individual. But this means that the planner would value the activity of i only if
the activity benefit 1 is larger than the sum of mutual external effects. Unless the potential
entrant is perfectly altruistic and weighs his or her external effect on the other individual as
highly as the external benefit that the incumbent has on the well-being of the entrant, then
excessive contact may take place.
A typical scenario is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots the different conditions for equi-
librium and social optimality in (pi, pj)-space for the special case where the individuals’health
states are independent and where the individuals are selfish. The upward-sloping red switching
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Figure 2: Equilibria and optimal outcomes under incidental contacts in (pi, pj)-space.
curve shows combinations of infection probabilities (pi, pj) such that individual i is indifferent
between contact and no contact, given that the other individual j chooses to expose him or
her self.6 At points above the switching curve, individual i prefers to abstain, while for points
below it, individual i prefers contact. Similar interpretation holds for points above and below
individual j’s switching curve, rendered in blue. Last, the switching curves for the social plan-
ner are shown in black. The curves trace out different areas as follows. In areas I, equilibrium
is unique and one individual will choose to enter while the other will stay out. In such cases, it
is always the most at-risk individual who chooses to abstain. But as contact is incidental, the
at-risk individual j’s reluctance to have contact does not preclude individual i from benefiting
from being active. Thus the individual who would potentially have the strongest negative
externality on the other is the sole individual to actually be active. One can think of this
equilibrium as a situation in which only the infected access the public space, because everyone
else is (justifiably) afraid of becoming infected. In area II, there are multiple equilibria. In
either equilibrium, only one individual enters, while the other stays out. In contrast to the
cases in areas I, in area II it is not necessarily the most at-risk individual who abstains. In
areas III and IV, equilibrium is again unique and both individuals always choose contact.
Turning to socially optimal choices, the planner would prefer both individuals to have
contact only in areas III and for only a single individual to be active otherwise. This means in
particular that equilibrium decisions are socially optimal except in areas IV. The intuition for
these results can be understood in terms of external effects that the decisions of the individuals
have on each other’s valuations. Recall that the planner only prefers contact when the external
effects are not too high. In the case of incidental contacts, this externality is one of potential
transmission of infection. From the figure, it is clear that this externality is smallest when
there is positive assortative matching so the individuals are likely to have the same health
state. In these cases, neither individual can infect the other and thus it is socially optimal
to have contact. In other cases, transmission risks are more substantial and so the infection
externalities will be greater. In Appendix A, I consider the case in which the switching curves
are non-overlapping.
6In case individual j decides not to be active, then the relevant part of the figure is the set of all points
along the x-axis, at which individual i has a dominant strategy to become active.
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4. Physical proximity is essential
In this section, consider the case in which contacts are essential, i.e. where both infection and
socioeconomic externalities are present. In this case, I assume that f(ai, aj) = min{ai, aj} and
thus material preferences are given by7
Ui(ai, aj) = ai [min{ai, aj} − ajrijb] (28)
This utility function implies that for either individual to benefit from being active, there must
be contact. In addition, it implies that either individual can unilaterally block the other from
deriving any benefit from being active. Similar preferences were used in Philipson and Posner
(1993) to capture voluntary sexual interactions.
Individual i will seek to maximize the altruistic criterion
Vi(ai, aj) = min{ai, aj}(ai + Aaj)− aiajb(rij + Arji) (29)
Aggregate utilitarian social welfare is then
W (ai, aj) = (1 + A) [min{ai, aj}(ai + aj)− aiajb(rij + rji)] (30)
4.1. Equilibrium outcomes. There are two cases to consider:
(i) Suppose that
Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = 0 (31)
Vj(1, 1) ≥ Vj(0, 1) = 0 (32)
In this case, the unique equilibrium is (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1).
(ii) Suppose that
Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = 0 (33)
Vj(1, 1) < Vj(0, 1) = 0 (34)
In this case, some individual objects to the contact and thus (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (0, 0).
8
Summing up, in equilibrium either both agree to have contact or one of the two individuals
find the risks from exposure too high and so blocks the contact. In the latter case, it is always
the individual with most to lose from the contact who will be pivotal and will effectively decide
whether contact takes place. This will turn out to be important, once the effects of increased
altruism are considered.
4.2. Socially optimal outcomes. First consider case (i) with (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1). Adding
up the two incentive constraints yields
Vi(1, 1) + Vj(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) + Vj(0, 1) = 0 (35)
But this is exactly the condition that ensures that the planner prefers there to be two active
individuals rather than none (recall that since contact is now essential, the alternative to two
active individuals is that no individual is active).
Next, consider case (ii) with (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (0, 0). It is easily seen that in this case, it is not
necessarily true that Vi(1, 1) + Vj(1, 1) ≥ 0, which is the condition for social optimality of
7Since ai, aj ∈ {0, 1}, this formulation is equivalent to the contact benefit function f(ai, aj) = aiaj .
8Under essential contacts, the equivalent of case (iii) under incidental contacts is superfluous as it takes only
one individual abstaining for the contact to be blocked.
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Figure 3: Equilibria and optimal outcomes under essential contacts in (pi, pj)-space.
outcomes with contact between individuals. In this case, social optimality depends on the
magnitudes of the individuals’respective valuations.
A typical example is illustrated in Figure 3. The basic switching curves of the individuals
are exactly as in Figure 2, but the switching curves for the planner are now modified due to
the presence of the socioeconomic externality. Also note that even though the individual’s
switching curves are unaltered, the equilibrium outcomes differ radically from those under
incidental contacts.
Again, the curves give rise to a number of different areas, but the equilibrium outcomes
are now different because of the change in the activity benefit function. In areas I, II and
IV, equilibrium is unique and involves either or both individuals abstaining. As contacts are
essential, it is enough for either individual to abstain for the contact to be blocked. Only in areas
III do both individuals agree to contact and so in such cases, the unique equilibrium involves
activity by both. Turning to the outcomes preferred by the planner, equilibria are socially
optimal except in areas IV. But note that in contrast to the case with incidental contacts,
under essential contacts the planner would prefer there to be contacts for such combinations
(pi, pj) in which one or the other individual would choose to object.
To better understand these results, recall that under essential contacts, the most at risk
individual can always block the contact. This implies that there are cases in which the potential
benefits from contact of the willing individual far outweigh the expected loss of the unwilling
individual. Thus on aggregate, social welfare would be increased by the contact taking place,
but as participation must be voluntary, in equilibrium the contact is blocked.
In Appendix A, I consider the case in which the switching curves are non-overlapping.
5. Increasing altruism
In this section, I will briefly outline what happens when people become increasingly altruistic.
By construction, the case A = 0 yields the perfectly selfish equilibrium outcomes, while for
A = 1, people’s incentives coincide exactly with those of the social planner. But note that
while increasing altruism thus helps align private and public incentives, social welfare itself
also increases. In fact, for A = 1, welfare becomes
W (ai, aj) = 2 (Ui(ai, aj) + Uj(aj, ai)) (36)
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The reason is simply that each person values the material utility of the other person as much
as his or her own material utility. Thus on aggregate, welfare becomes twice the sum of the
material utilities.
So altruism clearly makes everyone better off. More interestingly, I will now consider how
increased altruism influences the incentive constraints and thus the equilibrium outcomes. As
is to be expected, this turns out to depend on whether contacts are incidental or essential.
Incidental contacts. For incidental contacts, recall that the for exposure to be a best
response for individual i to the exposure by individual j, it must be that Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = A,
which can be rewritten as
Ui(1, 1) ≥ Abrji (37)
In other words, individual i’s material utility must be larger than the altruism-adjusted infec-
tion externality that exposure has on individual j. But as the level of altruism A increases, this
inequality becomes harder to satisfy as the material utility does not depend on A. This means
that starting in a situation in which both individuals are active and thus there is contact,
increasing altruism may result in equilibrium switching so that only one individual remains
active. Thus increasing altruism unambiguously decreases contact, disease transmission and
infection externalities.
Essential contacts. For essential contacts, there are several cases to consider. To set the
stage, recall that for exposure to be a best response for an individual i to the exposure by the
other individual j, it needs to be the case that Vi(1, 1) ≥ Vi(0, 1) = 0, which can be rewritten
as
Ui(1, 1) + AUj(1, 1) ≥ 0 (38)
For (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1) to be an equilibrium, necessarily Ui(1, 1) ≥ 0. But the magnitude of Uj(1, 1)
can in principle be of either sign, giving rise to different cases. This means that the left-hand
side of the constraint, which increases at the rate Uj(1, 1) when altruism A is increased, can
be either increasing or decreasing.
Case 1: Ui(1, 1) ≥ Uj(1, 1) ≥ 0. In this case, increasing altruism unambiguously makes the
inequality easier to satisfy and so starting from an equilibrium (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1), this outcome
remains an equilibrium with more altruistic individuals.
Case 2: Ui(1, 1) ≥ 0 ≥ Uj(1, 1), with
Ui(1, 1) + AUj(1, 1) ≥ 0 (39)
Uj(1, 1) + AUi(1, 1) ≥ 0 (40)
In this case, since Ui(1, 1) ≥ Uj(1, 1), an increase in A does not alter the inequalities and
(a∗i , a
∗
j) = (1, 1) remains the equilibrium.
Case 3: Ui(1, 1) ≥ 0 ≥ Uj(1, 1), with
Ui(1, 1) + AUj(1, 1) ≥ 0 (41)
Uj(1, 1) + AUi(1, 1) < 0 (42)
In this case, (a∗i , a
∗
j) = (0, 0) is the unique equilibrium because individual j blocks the
contact. When altruism increases, the left-hand side of individual i’s incentive constraint
decreases, while that of individual j increases. Thus the incentive for i to have contact weakens
while that of j strengthens, meaning that one of two things can happen. If Uj(1, 1) is only
marginally below zero and so individual j is almost indifferent, an increase in altruism can




(1, 1). Conversely, if individual i is almost indifferent but j is not, then an increase in altruism
can instead switch the incentive constraint of i so that neither will wish to have contact. In
this case, increased altruism does not change the outcome as j already blocked the contact
before A was increased.9
In summary, higher altruism may switch equilibrium in the direction of higher exposure
and contact and would therefore lead to higher disease transmission.
6. Discussion
In this paper, I have considered a simple model of disease transmission in which infection
externalities and socioeconomic externalities can be studied in conjunction. In this setup, I
distinguished between different types of contacts and externalities and showed that they lead to
different equilibrium ineffi ciencies in exposure behavior. In particular, the analysis showed that
social welfare considerations call for limiting incidental contacts that have no intrinsic benefits
but lead to disease transmission. In contrast, essential contacts, which society deems to be
intrinsically beneficial because of their socioeconomic externalities, may need to be weighed
against their harm in terms of propagating the disease.
In terms of implementing socially desirable contact and activity patterns, a straightforward
way is to influence behavior not only though direct restrictions on contacts but also by means
of penalties and subsidies. By aligning individual incentives with the interests of society at
large, they may go some way towards correcting uninternalized external effects, be they disease
externalities or broader socioeconomic externalities.
A. The Non-overlapping case
In the main text, I considered the cases where the two individuals’switching curves intersected.
This is the scenario that occurs for suffi ciently high value of the parameter b. For suffi ciently
low levels of b, the switching curves no longer intersect. In this appendix, I briefly outline the
results for this case.
Figure 4 shows the case of incidental contacts. For simplicity, I have labeled the relevant
areas with Arabic numerals. In all cases, the equilibrium is unique. In areas 1, in equilibrium
only one individual is active and this is socially optimal. In area 2, both individuals are
active but it would be socially optimal to have only one active individual. Last, in areas 3,
in equilibrium both individuals are active, which is also the socially optimal outcome. Figure
5 shows the case of essential contacts. In all cases, there is a unique equilibrium. In areas
1, in equilibrium only one individual is active and this is socially suboptimal. In area 2,
in equilibrium both individuals are active and this is socially optimal. Last, in areas 3, in
equilibrium only one individual is active and this is socially optimal.
9Note that the left-hand side of individual i’s incentive constraint always decreases at a lower rate than
the rate at which the left-hand side of individual j’s incentive constraint increases. Whether the incentive
constraint of one or the other individual switches sign first, depends on their relative distance to zero. A
suffi cient condition for an increase in A to lead to an unambiguous shift to the equilibrium (a∗i , a
∗
j ) = (1, 1) is
that 2 > b(rij + rji).
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Figure 4: Equilibria and optimal outcomes under incidental contacts in the non-overlapping
case in (pi, pj)-space.
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